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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DAVID E. HOWARD, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.
8106

TOWN OF NORTH SALT LAKE, a
Municipal Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a proceeding for the restriction of
corporate limits taken under the provisions of Chapter 4,
Title 15, U. C. A. 1943, now Chapter 4, Title 10, U. C. A.
1953. The appellant, Town of North Salt Lake, will be
designated herein as the "Town". Respondents are real
property owners whose premises were disconnected from
the town by decree of the trial court. They will be designated herein as the "Petitioners". Emphasis has been supplied.
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Only two questions are presented on this appeal,
namely, ( 1) Did the requisite number of real property
owners join in the petition for disconnection, and (2) Did
justice and equity require the disconnection. The Trial
Court resolved each of these questions in the affirmative,
and decree of disconnection was entered.
Petitioners believe that a proper determination of
these issues requires at the outset a full presentation of
the facts. In our opinion, the statement of the town is not
sufficient for such purposes. We have, therefore, made a
statement of all facts which we believe to be pertinent to
each issue. In order to assist the Court, we have also attached to this brief two maps, one showing the area of the
town prior to the annexation involved and the area covered
by the annexation, and the other showing the area of the
town after disconnection and the area disconnected by the
decree of the Trial Court.
Facts Respecting First Issue
The facts with respect to this issue are not in dispute
and not drawn into question by the points relied upon by
the town. The record references to such facts will, therefore, be to the findings of the Trial Court.
On April 21, 1952, the town by ordinance annexed an
area embracing substantially in excess of 3440 acres contiguous to its westerly and northerly boundary lines. On
or about the 7th day of August, 1952, petitioners, under
the provisions of said Chapter 4, filed their petition in the
District Court of Davis County, praying for the disconnec-
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tion from the town of a portion of the territory so annexed
by said ordinance and alleging in substance
(a) The passage of the annexation ordinance
of April 21, 1952,
(b) That the petitioners constituted a majority of the real property owners of the territory
sought to be disconnected, and
(c) That justice and equity required the disconnection of the territory, particularly described,
upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in
the petition.
A description of the area sought to be disconnected was set
forth in said petition with map attached, and parties were
designated to act for the petitioners as required by said
Section 10-4-1, U. C. A. 1953.
Notice of the filing of said petition with a copy thereof
was duly served on the town and publication made as required by said section. The town made and filed its answer
in the proceedings.
The matter came on for trial before the Court on December 18, 1952. Prior to the introduction of any evidence,
written motions were presented to the Court signed individually by fifteen persons alleging that each was a real
property owner within the territory sought to be disconnected and praying for leave to intervene as a plaintiff
and petitioner in support of the petition on file. Over the
objection of the town, these motions were granted, and
such parties were permitted to intervene and become plaintiffs and petitioners in support of the petition.
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Upon the hearing in the case, unusual and difficult
problems were presented to the Trial Court in reaching a
determination as to who were real property owners of the
territory sought to be disconnected within the meaning of
said Chapter 4.
Within the territory sought to be disconnected, there
were two old subdivisions designated as Sulphur Springs
Addition and North Salt Lake, Plat B. These subdivisions
were platted prior to statehood. At the time of the trial,
and for many years prior thereto, however, these had been
only paper subdivisions for the reason that no streets, sidewalks, or alleys were open or laid out upon the ground, no
homes or other structures had been built upon any of the
lots within the area. No fences had been constructed or lot
boundaries established, and the entire subdivided area was
simply open grazing land no different from the surrounding
territory. Subsequent to platting, lots had been sold within
these subdivisions. Most of these lots had, prior to trial,
been acquired by Davis County under general tax sale proceedings, and had been sold to Bountiful Livestock Company, and were being used by that Company for grazing
purposes. The general ownership plats in the Office of the
County Recorder did not show the individual ownership
of lots within these subdivisions, and petitioners were not
apprised of such ownerships from an examination of such
ownership plats. However, Gordon Gurr, a licensed abstracter, who made a title search of the entire territory
sought to be disconnected in preparation for trial, determined from a careful examination of the records that there
were still eleven individuals owning one or more lots in
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these subdivisions. The area embraced in all these lots was
insignificant in relation to the whole territory sought to be
disconnected. The Trial Court concluded, however, that
each of these eleven parties was a real property owner
within the meaning of the statute and should be counted
as such (R. 75).
On the extreme westerly side of the territory sought
to be disconnected, lying near the Jordan River, was a 15
acre parcel which had theretofore been owned by one Margaret Ann Reed Rudy. Title search showed that she was
dead, and that this parcel had been distributed in proceedings in her estate to twelve individuals. No further evidence of ownership relative to this parcel appeared of
record. However, search conducted by petitioners, in an
effort to establish actual ownership, showed that at the
time of trial, there were twenty-four individual members
of the Rudy family owning fractional undivided interests
in this parcel. The Trial Court concluded that even though
the interest of these individuals was fractional and small,
each must be counted as a real property owner under the
statute (R. 76).
The Trial Court was also confronted in certain instances, with cases in which the record owner had sold a
parcel under contract, and was under the necessity of determining who was the owner within the meaning of the
statute. In such cases, the Trial Court concluded that a
purchaser under an effective contract was the real property
owner within the meaning of the statute, and should be
counted as such (R. 78-79).
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The territory affected by the proceedings was traversed
by easements of various kinds held by The Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company, Wasatch Gas Company,
Utah Oil Refining Company, and Utah Power and Light
Company. The Trial Court concluded that each of these
easement holders must be counted as a real property owner
under the statute, even though the easement did not, in some
instances, give the holder thereof dominion over or exclusive
right to any portion of the surface of the premises (R.
79-80).
In addition to the foregoing, there were problems arising from ownerships held by trustees, devisees, tax titles
held by Davis County in its governmental capacity, and
the ownership held by Salt Lake City in its proprietary
capacity of some 570 acres in the territory involved. All
of these problems were finally resolved by the Trial Court,
and none of its determinations are objected to by the town
on this appeal (R. 76-80).
In the final phases of the trial, in order to assist the
Court in resolving the questions of ownership herein set
forth, both the petitioners and the town prepared exhibits
setting forth their respective theories and claims respecting
the number and names of the real property owners within
the territory. Under the computation of the petitioners,
there were eighty-two owners, and under that of the town,
ninety owners (R. 80).
The Trial Court considered the contentions of the
parties and after resolving the questions as herein set forth,
finally found and concluded that there were actually eighty-
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six real property owners within the meaning of the statute
in the territory involved (R. 82).
In the opinion of the Trial Court, the real property
owners who were permitted to intervene prior to the commencement of the trial, stood in precisely the same position as other real property owners, and should, in all respects, be treated as though they had signed the petition
in the first instance. Of the fifteen so permitted to intervene, the Trial Court found that fourteen were real property owners within the meaning of the statute (R. 83).
Of those signing the petition in the first instance, the
Trial Court found that forty-one were real property owners
within the meaning of the statute, these to be treated in
all respects the same as the fourteen intervening property
owners ( R. 83) .
Counting the interveners and the initial signers, and
treating ther.ll in all respects the same, there were accordingly fifty-five real property owners joining in the petition,
or a clear majority of the eighty-six owners found by the
Court (R. 84).
Wholly apart from numerical ownerships and considering the representation on an area basis alone, it is significant to observe that the owners of more than 95% of
the territory involved joined in the petition for disconnection (R. 84).
The Trial Court found, and there is no suggestion to
the contrary, that the allegations of ownership made in the
petition as originally filed were made in good faith upon
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the basis of ownership information then reasonably relied
upon (R. 83).
The essential dispute on this issue is whether the Trial
Court, upon all the evidence being introduced and the issue
of representation submitted to it for decision, should count
all parties then before it as petitioners or whether it should
count only those who signed the petition in the first instance. The town would count only the initial signers. We
think, as did the Trial Court, that all parties should be
counted and treated alike.
I

. Facts Respecting Second Issue
The facts with respect to the issue of justice and
·equity fall under two problems. The one has to do with
municipal services which the town was rendering for the
benefit of the territory involved relating to such functions
as water supply, fire protection, police protection, roads,
and the like. The other relates to the contentions of the
town with respect to the health and welfare of its inhabitants because of the sewage disposal operations and facilities of Salt Lake City. Because there is no substantial
dispute of the facts relating to the first problem, and there
is some question of fact on the second problem, we have
treated these questions in the order indicated above.
Prior to the annexation of April 21, 1952, the town
had a population of some 255 persons. It embraced an area
of approximately 480 acres, which extended along the main
highway between Salt Lake City and Ogden, the southerly
boundary line of the town being common with the northerly
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boundary line of Salt Lake City. The Annexation Ordinance of April, 1952, brought into the town an area substantially in excess of 3440 acres. The disparity between
the area of the town as it existed prior to the annexation
and that embraced in the town after the annexation is
graphically shown upon the prints attached to this brief.
In the annexation of April, 1952, certain parcels of
land owned by Cudahy Packing Company, Salt Lake Stockyards, Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Company were excluded, forming an island in the center of the
territory involved, embracing approximately 280 acres.
This island area is likewise graphically shown upon the
prints attached to this brief. The reasons which led the
town to exclude the island area and causing it to annex an
area more than ten times larger, surrounding the island,
are not disclosed.
The petitioners, in their petition for disconnection, did
not seek to have disconnected from the town the entire area
which was embraced in the annexation of April 21, 1952,
but endeavored to proceed along logical and reasonable lines
permitting the town to retain that portion of the area which
follows its natural geographical boundaries along and adjacent to the highway. Accordingly, petitioners sought to
disconnect only that area lying westerly of what they regarded as the logical town boundaries, and extending on to
the Jordan River. The area sought to be excluded embraced
approximately 3440 acres. No part of this territory was
included in the original limits of the town nor embraced
therein at any time prior to the annexation of April, 1952.
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After the annexation of April, 1952, the area then included in the town may be divided generally and logically
into two classifications, namely, higher land located along
and near the main highway and a short distance westerly
thereof, and lower land extending from a point westerly
of the highway to the Jordan River. The territory sought
to be disconnected included substantially all of the lower
land, while the remaining area included substantially all
of the higher land. The land sought to be disconnected is
largely of a low, swampy character with high water tables,
parts of the area being usually covered with surface water
during the late winter and early spring. Portions of said
territory are suitable for farming, and have, in prior years,
been used for that purpose. Most of the area, however, is
now, and for many years, has been used for the purpose
of grazing livestock. During a period of some five years
prior to trial, industrial concerns including those engaging
in oil refining and related activities have purchased land
and established industries within the territory involved.
The plants and facilities of these companies are located
principally near the easterly line of the territory involved,
accessible to railroad trackage. At the time of trial, about
one-third of the area involved was owned by industrial
companies, though a substantial portion of the land so
owned was not then being occupied or devoted to industrial
purposes (R. 74-84-85).
There were only six homes located upon the territory
disconnected. The logical and likely area for the development and expansion of residential construction in the general area lies within the town boundaries as they were re-
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11
stricted by the disconnection and northerly and easterly of
such boundaries. Within such area, there is ample room
for any presently foreseeable dwelling requirements of
the town. The future growth and expansion of the town
will not require the area sought to be disconnected, and
such area is not necessary for the use of the town (R. 8588).
With the exception of the two old subdivisions herein
referred to, no part of the territory involved has been
subdivided. No streets or alleys existed in those subdivisions. The only road completely traversing the disconnected
territory at the time of trial was Cudahy Lane. One lane
extended from the limits of the town as they existed prior
to April, 1952, in a westerly direction to the center of Section 10, Township 1 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. There was but one lane traversing the territory in a
north and south direction. At the time of trial, an industrial
highway had been surveyed, and bids for its construction
let, but actual work had not yet begun. This industrial
highway would extend through a portion of the westerly
part of the disconnected territory. Cudahy Lane had been
surfaced in part, and the town during 1952, had expended
some funds on the maintenance of this road. A part of such
expenditure may have been applied to that portion of the
road lying within the disconnected territory. Apart from
the expenditure on said Cudahy Lane, there was no substantial expenditure in the maintenance of roads by the
town; and except for said Cudahy Lane, there were no improved streets within the territory. There were no sidewalks, curbs or gutters within the area involved (R. 85).
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The town had no fire department ; and ever since its
organization, the town has relied upon the fire fighting
facilities of Davis County for fire protection. The town
could not afford any substantial fire protection to any of
the property owners within the disconnected area. Salt
Lake Refining Company, one of the industrial concerns in
the disconnected area, had, at its substantial expense, purchased its own fire fighting equipment, and was constantly
engaged in a program for the training of its personnel in
refinery fire fighting methods. Because of the peculiar
hazards in oil refinery fires, this owner would not permit
anyone but skilled firemen within its premises in event of
a fire (R. 86).
The only police protection provided by the town was
afforded through a marshal. The owners of grazing lands,
comprising most of the area sought to be disconnected, require no police protection other than that afforded by the
sheriff of Davis County; and the industries located within
the disconnected area, were receiving, and would receive,
no substantial benefit from the police protection afforded
by the town (R. 86).
The water supply of the town at the time of trial came
from certain springs and wells and was sufficient only to
supply the requirements of the inhabitants of the town as
it was constituted prior to April 21, 1952, and the requirements of those inhabitants of that part of the territory
annexed by the ordinance of that date not affected by these
proceedings. Those industries conducting operations within
the disconnected territory and requiring substantial quantities of water have been under the necessity of acquiring
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their supply from other sources. Salt Lake Refining Company, which consumes a large quantity of water, obtains
its supply from Salt Lake City and from wells. The owners
of agricultural and grazing lands in the territory involved
do not presently need any additional supply of water. Their
requirements at the time of hearing and for many years
prior thereto, had been satisfied through wells. The town
has made application for additional water supply from the
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. Independent
applications for water from the same source have been
made by certain of the industries in the area involved. If
and when the Water Conservancy District is completed, the
town should have available additional supplies of water.
Industries which have made like applications will, however,
have independent water supplies from the same source. The
development of water from this source is dependent upon
Congressional appropriation, and some years subsequent to
the trial date will probably elapse before such water will
actually be delivered to the area (R. 87).
The town was organized as herein shown in 1946. No
part of the territory disconnected by the decree of the Trial
Court was then included in the area of the town or included
therein at any time prior to the annexation of April, 1952.
Between 1946 and April, 1952, certain industries, particularly those relating to petroleum refining, purchased lands
in Davis County outside and westerly of the then corporate
limits of the town, and established their plants and facilities upon such premises. It was not until the establishment
of these industries that the annexation of April, 1952, occurred. The creation and establishment of the town was,
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however, entirely unrelated to the location and establishment of these industries (R. 87-88).
There are no schools or churches within the town, and
there is no community relationship or dependency between
any of the property owners in the area sought to be disconnected and the town. The water supply of the town as
herein shown is not related to the water supply of the individual property owners or the industries within the disconnected area. Highway traffic to and from a large portion of the disconnected area does not actually pass through
the town. Thus, Salt Lake Refining Company, one of the
principal industries in the disconnected area, in order to
obtain access to its premises, built at its cost and expense
roads leading southerly from its plant to connect with the
streets of Salt Lake City. All highway traffic to and from
this plant passes over this road and onto streets of Salt
Lake City or State highways before any such traffic may
reach a street within the town. Of some two hundred persons employed by this industry, only one employee, at the
time of trial, resided within the town of North Salt Lake.
The town has a post office, but none of the mail of this
Company is either received or deposited at this post office.
The dependency upon and relationship of the industries to
a municipality is with Salt Lake City, rather than the town.
The property disconnected by the decree of the Trial Court
received no direct or special benefits resulting from the
exercise of the powers granted to the town (R. 88).
Consideration will now be given to the second phase
of the issue of justice and equity. In its answer, the town
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alleges that the health and welfare of its inhabitants requires that the annexed area remain within the town.
This allegation relates to the disposition of sewage.
Certain of the facts in connection with this matter are
not in dispute. The southerly portion of the premises involved is cut through with sewer lines, ditches, and canals.
The sewage of Salt Lake City reaches the territory in question through two closed conduits. Both these conduits empty
into an open sewer canal. One conduit carrying sewage by
gravity empties into the east end of the open canal at a
point about 600 feet west of the center of Section 11, the
other conduit carrying pumped sewage empties into the
open canal near the center of Section 10. The open canal
extends westerly from said point in Section 11 about 11t4
miles where it passes under the Jordan River. It then runs
north along the west bank of the river about 8 miles and
empties into Great Salt Lake. Salt Lake City has employed
this method of sewage disposal for many years, commencing long prior to the organization of the town.
At a time some years prior to the hearing date, a dam
had been constructed in said sewer canal, and the waters
diverted for the purpose of irrigating lands within the
disconnected area. This dive-rsion had been stopped some
time prior to hearing date, the outlet of the dam effectively
blocked, and there was no evidence or indication at the time
of the trial that sewage water would, in the future, be used
to irrigate any of the lands in the area sought to be disconnected.
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The course of the Salt Lake City open sewer canal is
likewise shown upon the prints attached to this brief.
The evidence at the trial dealt primarily with the existence of the 114 miles of open sewer canal within the area
annexed by the town under the ordinance of April, 1952,
and the possible health hazard to the inhabitants of the town
from the existence of the canal.
From the evidence, these propositions are established:
(a) The problem of sewage disposal of the
cities, towns, and communities along the Wasatch
front from the southerly end of Utah County to the
northerly end of Weber County because of ultimate
drainage into Great Salt Lake is a problem which
must be approached on an over-all basis, and should
not be treated piece-meal (R. 489-90).
(b) Salt Lake City is presently engaged in a
sewage disposal program which will result in the
construction and operation of a sewage treatment
disposal plant or plants, and eliminate the existence
of the sewer canal herein referred to, and the discharge of raw sewage into Great Salt Lake (R.
495-96).
The sewer canal of Salt Lake City is unsightly. The
practice Salt Lake City employed at the time of trial, and
for many years prior thereto, of disposing of its sewage
by discharging the same into Great Salt Lake is no longer
an up-to-date method of sewage disposal. There is some
medical evidence that the existence of the sewer canal is
a potential hazard to the health of the inhabitants of the
surrounding area. However, in view of the program of
Salt Lake City now going forward for sewage disposal, it
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would in the opinion of a witness for the town be an unnecessary and unwise expenditure for Salt Lake City to pay
the amount necessary to enclose in a conduit or other pipe
that portion of the sewer canal located within the limits of
the town as they were extended by the ordinance of April,
1952 (R. 495-496, 504).
Quite obviously, there could be no interruption of the
sewage disposal of Salt Lake City. The method of disposal
employed at the time of trial had been used for many years
prior to the organization of the town. Until a new method
of disposal is placed in operation, the old method must necessarily be used. This is so whether the territory involved
is annexed to or disconnected from the town. The matter
of the sewage disposal by Salt Lake City is accordingly a
problem separate and apart from the question of the annexation or disconnection of the territory involved.
On the entire question of justice and equity, the Trial
Court, therefore found that these principles did not require
that the territory remain a part of the town and concluded
that it should be disconnected.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
A MAJORITY OF THE REAL PROPERTY
OWNERS OF THE TERRITORY INVOLVED
SIGNED THE PETITION FOR DISCONNECTION AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE.
(a)

The District Court had Jurisdiction.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
(b)

The Power of the District Court to Proceed
is Invoked by the Allegations of the Petition.

(c)

The Proceedings before the Court are Expressly Controlled by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

(d)

The Question of Whether the Requisite
Number of Real Property Owners Join in
the Petition for Disconnection Must Be Determined as of the Time That Issue is Passed
Upon by the Court.

(e)

The Statute Requires a Determination of the
Issue Involved Upon the Basis of the Facts
and Law at the Time of Trial.

(f)

Those Who Intervened Became Parties for
all Purposes to the Same Extent as though
They Had Signed the Petition in the First
Instance.
POINT II.

JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED
FROM THE TOWN.
(a)

No direct or special Benefit was received
by the Disconnected Area resulting from the
Exercise of the Powers of the Town.

(b)

The future Growth and Expansion of the
Town Will Not Require the Disconnected
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Territory, nor is it Necessary for the Use of
the Town.
(c)

There is no Interrelation or Dependency between the Disconnected Territory and the
Town.

(d)

The Health and Welfare of the Residents of
the Town do not Require that the Disconnected Territory Remain a Part of the Town.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A MAJORITY OF THE REAL PROPERTY
OWNERS OF THE TERRITORY INVOLVED
SIGNED THE PETITION FOR DISCONNECTION AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE.
(a)

The District Court had Jurisdiction.

In its brief, the town contends that the court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief of disconnection. This
contention requires a consideration of the fundamental
nature of jurisdiction.
The term "jurisdiction" is one which is often loosely
and improperly applied. We are not here concerned with
jurisdiction of the court over any person. Our problem relates to jurisdiction over the subject matter. Accurately
stated, such jurisdiction is the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case. It is the power,
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lawfully conferred, to deal with the general subject involved
in the action. See 14 Am. Jur. Courts, Section 160.
Here the subject matter involved is the restriction of
the corporate limits of the town. Power to deal with this
subject matter was expressly conferred upon the District
Courts under the Constitution of the State of Utah and by
the provisions of the said Chapter 4, Title 10, U. C. A.
1953.
This court in Young, et al. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah
321, 67 P. 1066, expressly held that this power was lawfully
conferred. Clearly, then, the District Court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case.
The cases cited in the brief of the town do not compel
any contrary result. A careful reading of Young, et al. v.
Salt Lake City, supra, and Application of Peterson, 92 Utah
212, 66 P. 2d 1195, discloses no holding to the effect that
the district court is not vested with jurisdiction over the
subject matter involved in this case.
In its brief, the town contends that the court below
was without jurisdiction to grant the relief of disconnection for the reason that the petition, as originally filed, did
not physically contain the signatures of 50% of the total
number of property owners as ultimately determined by
the court.
To support this contention, the town cites authorities
on two basic propositions, neither of which is contested by
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petitioners herein, and neither of which is determinative
of the issues in this case. These propositions are :
(a) That the creation of a city and the fixing
of its boundaries is essentially a legislative and not
a judicial function.
(b) That there must be a compliance with
statutory conditions before territory may be detached from a city.
Authorities need hardly be cited to support either of
these propositions as stated. It is the meaning and application of the latter proposition, however, which is critical
in the instant case. The town maintains that this rule,
as applied to this case, requires that the percentage of
property owners specified in the statute must affix their
signatures to the petition before the same is filed in the
court. Yet, the only applicable authorities cited in support
of such a contention are cases in which it was found that
the required number of property owners were not present
in any fashion before the court or administrative body involved. This is a very different proposition from the one
contended for by the town, and petitioners agree that, if
such were the case here, the court would not have been
authorized by the statute to order the disconnection appealed from.
In this case, however, a majority of the property owners were before the court during the trial of the issues
raised by the petition and long before the sufficiency of
said petition was determined. We will show in this brief
that, under such circumstances, the court had jurisdiction
to decree a disconnection.
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(b)

The Power of the District Court to Proceed
is Invoked by the Allegations of the Petition.

Having found that the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the restriction of corporate boundariest
we must inquire as to how this jurisdiction is exercised.
This becomes a procedural matter. The said chapter sets
forth the requirements of this procedure; namely, the filing
of a petition in a certain form with certain allegations. A
petition with the requisite statutory allegations was filed
in the present case. Under the allegations of such a petition, and upon the filing of the same, the court is authorized to exercise the power conferred upon it by the statute.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine comes
from the grant of powers over the subject matter. The
exercise of that power is set in motion by the petition. The
jurisdiction of the court in such a case can be tested by a
motion to dismiss. Assume that prior to hearing the town
had filed a motion to dismiss based upon a jurisdictional
ground. The motion would most surely be denied for the
obvious reason that under the petition the court had the
power to hear and determine the case.
The principles here stated have many times been recognized by the courts. We believe it unnecessary to extend
this brief by citations on this proposition. Typical of the
many cases which have so held is that of Malden Trust Company v. Brooks (Mass.) 177 N. E. 629, 80 A. L. R. 1028.
The facts in that case were that prior to 1929, the Probate
Courts of Massachusetts had no equity jurisdiction. In
1929, an amendment was passed to the statute extending
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the jurisdiction of probate courts to certain equity matters,
and providing that such jurisdiction might be exercised
upon petition according to the usual course of procedure
in probate courts. A petition was filed, and an answer made
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. In holding that
the allegations of the petition entitled the court to proceed
and must be taken as true for that purpose, the court said
in part:
It is for a court with jurisdiction in equity to determine whether or not the obligation has been fulfilled. If the allegations of the petition are proved,
the appellants will be found to be holding in trust,
by reason of Brooks' breach of fiduciary duty, a fund
to which the petitioner and the beneficiaries under
the will of Carlos E. Ball are entitled. That the
quoted statute, supra, gives jurisdiction to the probate court to ascertain the facts in support of the
allegations of the petition is not open to serious
question.

So in the case at bar, the district court was entitled to
proceed upon the allegations as set forth in the petition.
The proof of these allegations became an issue which the
court was bound to determine; and as we will hereafter
point out, the time for the proof of these issues was at the
trial of the case when submitted to the court for its determination.
(c)

The Proceedings before the Court are Expressly Controlled by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The said Section 10-4-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides, among
other things, that
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Issue shall be joined and the cause tried as provided
for the trial of civil causes as nearly as may be.
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
paragraph (a) thereof, among other things, that
These rules shall govern the procedure in the supreme court, the district courts, city courts, and
justice courts of the State of Utah, in all actions,
suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.
Rule 81 makes no exception for proceedings taken for
the restriction of corporate limits.
Rule 20 dealing with the permissive joinder of parties
in paragraph (a) provides among other things that
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action.
Rule 21 dealing with misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties provides in part that
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or of its own
initative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just.
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Rule 24 dealing with intervention in paragraph (a)
provides in part that
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action: ( 1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the representation of the applicant's interest
by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action * * *
From the foregoing provisions, it is clearly seen that
the proceeding here involved is one which is controlled by
the rules of civil procedure; that these rules are designed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action ; that parties may be added or dropped and
parties may intervene where the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment
in the action. It seems to us that this is the clearest kind
of a case for intervention.
(d)

The Question of Whether the Requisite
Number of Real Property Owners Join in
the Petition for Disconnection Must Be Determined as of the Time That Issue is Passed
Upon by the Court.

The question of whether the requisite number of real
property owners joined in the petition for disconnection is
one of the issues of the case. Petitioners are convinced that
essentially this is no different from the issue of justice and
equity. Each is a condition which the statute imposes to
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a disconnection of territory from a municipality, and each
must be found affirmatively before a valid decree of disconnection may be entered.
The town contends that the issue of representation
must be found on the basis of the facts as determined from
the petition initially filed with the court.
In the view of petitioners, this position is clearly erroneous. We believe the critical time for the determination
of the issue of representation is the time when that issue
is submitted to the trial court for decision. The propriety
of this rule may be tested by a simple example. Let us
assume a case in which the ultimate facts were found to be
the other way from the case at bar. Suppose a petition
were filed signed by 100 real property owners. Upon the
trial and before the introduction of any evidence, 15 of
these by appropriate motions withdrew their names, and
by order were dropped as petitioners. Upon the final determination of the issue of representation, the trial court
found that the remaining 85 did not constitute the requisite
number although the 100 were a clear majority. Under
the rule urged by the town, the trial court would be bound
to find that a majority of the real property -owners signed
the petition and the petitioners entitled to pr~vail ~n the
iss.ue of representation. Quite obviously, however, this
would be erroneous because when the issue of representation was submitted to and determined by the court, there
were not a majority of the real property owners in support of the petition before it.
The princi pie here involved was considered by this
court in the case of Halgren v. Welling, 91 Utah 16, 63 P.
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2d 550. This was a mandamus proceeding brought against
the Secretary of State to compel him to give effect to certain
withdrawal petitions and to eliminate from the initiative
petition the names of the withdrawing parties. The facts
were that the initiative petition as originally filed with the
Secretary of State contained the signatures of the requisite
number of voters; but before the petition was acted upon,
certain of the petitioners withdrew, reducing the signers
below the required number. The question was therefore
squarely presented as to whether the petitioners were entitled to withdraw prior to the petition being acted upon
and the effect of such withdrawal. The court, after carefully considering the entire problem and citing many cases, ,
held that a petitioner could withdraw prior to the petition
being acted upon, and where such withdrawal reduced the
number of petitioners below the statutory requirements, the
petition must fail. (Reaffirmed in Allan v. Rasmussen,
101 Utah 33, 117 P. 2d 287.)
So in the case at bar, it is the representation before
the court at the time when that issue is submitted to the
court for determination which controls. If at that time,
the requisite number of real property owners are before
the court, the petitioners on that issue are entitled to prevail, otherwise not.
Another helpful case, closely in point on the facts and
completely analogous in principle, is First National Bank,
et al. v. Village of South Pekin, 25 N. E. 2d 87. The Illinois
statute involved was similar to the Utah statute insofar as
the function of the court was concerned, though the grounds
upon which disconnection was required to be based were
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different. Under said statute, petitioners for disconnection
were required to allege, among other things, that the area
to be disconnected contained 20 or more acres. The statute
then provided, as does the Utah statute, as follows:
If the court finds that the allegations of said petition are true * * * it shall order said land disconnected * * *
Suit was brought to disconnect four tracts of land, one
of which contained only 13.40 acres. Petitions in intervention were allowed as to three additional tracts of land, each
of which contained less than 5 acres of land. The effect
of the intervention, however, was to join tracts with less
than the twenty acre limit to larger tracts so that contiguous tracts made "areas" larger than twenty acres. All of
the tracts were disconnected by the trial court.
The "device" of intervention was attacked in that case
as it is being attacked here, but the intermediate court upheld the trial court on two grounds, viz., that general procedural law governed statutory proceedings unless the statute specified otherwise, and that the law does not encourage
a multiplicity of suits when the same effect could be accomplished in one suit. The intermediate appellate court,
however, construed the statute as requiring that each tract
must contain 20 acres and reversed the decree as to the
four tracts containing less.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, at 29 N. E. 2d 590, reversed this interpretation of the statute and reinstated the
decree of the trial court. This holding, it is to be noted, is
directly in line with petitioner's contentions herein. But
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for the petitions in intervention, the allegations of the original petitioners could not have been found to be true.
(e)

The Statute Requires a Determination of the
Issue Involved Upon the Basis of the Facts
and Law at the Time of Trial.

Not only do the decisions which have considered this
problem hold that the critical time for the determination
of representation is the time of trial, but a careful consideration of the statute itself compels the same result.
Section 10-4-2 U. C. A. 1953, provides that:
If the court finds that the petition was signed by
a majority of the real property owners of the territory concerned and that the allegations of the petition are true and that justice and equity require that
such territory or any part thereof should be disconnected from such city or town, it shall appoint
three disinterested persons as commissioners to adjust the terms upon which such part shall be so
severed as to any liabilities of such city or town that
have accrued during the connection of such part with
the corporation, and as to the mutual property rights
of the city or town and the territory to be detached.
At first blush these provisions may seem to support
the contentions of the town. This section, however, must
be read in the light of the principles which we have found
to be controlling in these cases, and when so read it is seen
that the statute actually requires a determination of the
issue of representation as of the time the court is called
upon to make that determination and not at some prior
time when the petition was first signed or filed.
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Consider first the provisions relating to the signing
of the petition. The town contends that this language relates to the initial signing of the petition. The statute does
not so provide, the language is simply
If the court finds that the petition was signed by
a majority of the real property owners of the territory concerned * * *
There is no provision or requirement in this Section
that the petition must be signed by a majority at the time
it is first filed with the court. The plain implication of this
language is that the petition must be signed by a majority
of the real property owners at the time the court finds upon
the issue of representation. This construction is essential
in order to permit the court to consider the effect of those
who may have withdrawn their names before the issue
of representation was submitted and likewise those who
may have signed the petition after the same was filed.
Considering first the matter of withdrawing owners,
under the example which we have heretofore employed,
would anyone seriously contend that under the above quoted
statute, the trial court should find that 100 property owners
ultimately signed the petition. The finding of the court
must necessarily be that 85 property owners had signed
the petition under the facts as they existed upon the matter
being submitted to the court for decision. Conversely, if
property owners signed after the petition was filed, then
the court in its findings must consider all of such property
owners as signers at the time it is called upon to make its
findings and determination. Such a construction gives rec-
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ognition to the principles which control these proceedings
and the effect of the rules of civil procedure under which
they are conducted.
This leaves only the matter of what constitutes a signing of the petition within the meaning of the statute. It is
conceivable that upon this case being called for trial on the
18th of December, 1952, real property owners in addition
to those who had already signed the petition might have
been present in open court, and that these parties might
have requested leave to and been permitted to affix their
respective signatures to the petition. They would then clearly have signers of the petition.
Instead of coming into court personally, these parties
signed and filed separate written instruments in form substantially as follows :
Comes now Alpha Volk and moves for leave to
intervene as a petitioner and plaintiff in this action
in support of the petition and complaint on file
herein, upon the ground that she is one of the owners of the real property described in paragraph
numbered 3 of the complaint and petition on file
herein; that the statute in such actions confers an
unconditional right upon Applicant to appear as a
party petitioner and plaintiff herein; that representation of Applicant's interest by existing parties
may be inadequate and Applicant will be bound by
a judgment in this action.
Dated this 9th day of December, 1952.
(Signed) Alpha Volk
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These instruments were filed in court in accordance
with the rules of civil procedure. By the execution of these
instruments, the parties joined in the petitions as plaintiffs
and petitioners as effectively as though they had affixed
their signatures to the original petition itself. Their signatures were proved by evidence in the same manner as the
signatures of all other parties to the petition. They were
treated by the court and counsel in all respects as though
they had physically signed the petition. We think there
can be no doubt that they were within the meaning of said
statute, signers of the petition.
(f)

Those Who Intervened Became Parties for
all Purposes to the Same Extent as though
They Had Signed the Petition in the First
Instance.

Rule 24 (a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure is almost
identical to the Federal Rule of the same number.
In applying the federal rule, the courts have frequently
held that an intervener in an action or proceeding is for
all intents and purposes an original party.
Thus, in the case of In re Raabe, Glissman & Co., Inc.,
71 F. Supp. 679, a petition was filed by one claiming to be
a creditor to procure certain funds in a bankrupt estate.
The petitioner failed to prove that he was a qualified creditor. However, at the hearing, another creditor appeared
who was qualified. The court held the intervener entitled
to recover the funds, saying in part :
Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A. following section 723c, an
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intervenor in an action or proceeding is, for all
intents and purposes, an original party. The joinder
of Ehlerman in the proceedings was proper under
Rule 24 and would permit the court to retain jurisdiction thereof and pass upon his claim even though
the original petitioner was not a qualified claimant.
Rule 21, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 2 Cir., 117 F. 2d 95.
See also; Cabot v. Binney & Smith Co., 46 F. Supp. 346;
Marsh v. United States, 97 F. 2d 327; State of Kansas v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 95 F. 2d 935; Johnson, et al. v.
United States, 102 F. 2d 729.
The argument on Point I should not be concluded without considering the actual situation presented at the trial.
After days of hearing the Trial Court finally had before
it all the facts relative to ownership and representation,
as well as those relating to the issue of justice and equity.
The court determined that a majority of the real property
owners were before it in support of the petition. What do
the statute and rules of civil procedure require the court
to do under these circumstances? The town contends that
the whole proceeding should have then been dismissed, and
the parties compelled to go through all the steps necessary
again to bring the matter before the court. In the j udgment of petitioners, the Trial Court did precisely what the
statute and the rules require, namely, to adjudicate concerning the subject matter over which it had jurisdiction.
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POINT II.
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED
FROM THE TOWN.
The Trial Court found that justice and equity required
that the territory involved be disconnected from the town.
The essential que~tion on this appeal under this point is,
therefore, whether the findings of the Trial Court are supported by the evidence. Not only are such findings amply
supported by the evidence, but the facts are for the most
part not in dispute as will be shown from a consideration of
the following propositions:
(a)

No direct or special Benefit was received
by the Disconnected Area resulting from the
Exercise of the Powers of the Town.

It is elementary that in the exercise of municipal

powers, some substantial direct or special benefit must
be conferred upon territory within a town. Otherwise, it
is patently unjust and inequitable that the property within
such territory should be burdened with the taxes imposed
by the municipality.
Cities and towns are granted certain powers by the
legislature. Through the exercise of these powers, they are
enabled to confer certain direct or special benefits upon
territory within their corporate limits. It is the conferring
of these benefits which justify or require the inclusion of
territory within a town.
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If these benefits are not substantially conferred, then
justice and equity require that the territory be relieved of
the burdens imposed by the town. The special benefits
which a city or town may confer upon territory within its
limits relate to such matters as roads, sidewalks, curbs, and
gutters, sewage facilities, water supply, police protection,
and fire protection.

Before an appraisal may be made of the question of
whether these benefits were conferred upon the territory
involved in this case, it is necessary again to consider the
nature of the annexation involved and the extent and character of the territory affected. These facts are not in dispute.
As herein shown, the town was organized in 1946. In
1950, it had a population of some 255 persons. Prior to
the annexation of April, 1952, it embraced an area of approximately 480 acres. That annexation covered an area
substantially in excess of 3440 acres or more than seven
times the area of the town prior to annexation. The annexation of April, 1952, did not, however, include the premises
of the Cudahy Packing Company, Salt Lake Stock Yards,
Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Company.
The properties of these companies remained as an island
in the town embracing an area covering some 280 acres
or more than half the area of the town prior to the annexation.
The territory of the town as its limits were extended
by the annexation embraced land falling generally into
two classifications, namely, higher land and low land. Petitioners did not seek to disconnect from the town all of
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the territory annexed by the Ordinance of April, 1952.
Rather, they sought to disconnect only the low land, leaving within the town the higher land, which conformed to
the geographical boundaries of the town as they existed
prior to the annexation.
Turning to a consideration of the lands sought to be
disconnected, their location and character were shown in
the statement of facts. At the risk of redundancy, it may
be pointed out again that they are largely low and swampy
with high water tables, surfaces often covered with water
in late winter or early spring. A portion of the area has
heretofore been used for farming, but at the time of trial,
the lands were largely used for grazing. Within a period
of five years prior to trial, certain industries, including
those engaged in oil refining and related activities, purchased land and established plants within the territory involved. These plants are largely located near the easterly
side of the area in question, accessible to railroad trackage;
but even there, substantial fill was required to make the
land usable. At the time of trial, about a third of the area
was owned by industrial concerns, but only a part of such
ownership was actually being used for industrial purposes
(R. 359-76).
Considering the municipal benefits and directing attention to the matter of roads, sidewalks, curbs and gutters,
the facts are not in dispute. At the time of trial, there was
actually one road running through the area. This was an
east and west road known as Cudahy Lane, and as its name
implies, it runs to and primarily serves the packing plant
and stock yards area which, as herein shown, was never

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

annexed to the town. There were no sidewalks, curbs or
gutters within the town. In order to gain access to its
property, Salt Lake Refining Company, one of the principal
property owners, built its own road connecting its premises
directly with the streets of Salt Lake City (R. 242-68).
The water supply of the town is furnished through
springs and wells. No contention is made in the brief of
the town that its present supply is more than sufficient
to supply the requirements of its inhabitants within the
area as restricted by the disconnection decree of the Trial
Court. The town furnishes no water whatever for the disconnected territory. This territory has been compelled to
obtain its own water supply. The grazing lands secure their
water from wells ; other users from wells or outside sources.
Salt Lake Refining Company, the principal industry within
the area, obtains its supply from wells and from Salt Lake
City, through mains constructed at the expense of the industry (R. 242-68).
The town is seeking to augment its water supply under
applications to the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. So also is Salt Lake Refining Company. If and when
water becomes available at some future date from this
source, this industry will have an additional independent
water supply (R. 335-51).
The town had no fire department at the time of trial,
and so far as we are aware, presently has no such department. No benefit whatever was conferred upon the territory involved by the town in this respect.
As for police protection, the town has a marshal. The
grazing lands need little or no police protection. The prin-
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cipal oil refining company has never used any such protection, and prefers to rely upon its own security arrangements
(R. 295-302). The only service in this regard, pointed out
in the brief of the town, is the installation of a traffic light
on U. S. Highway 91, at a point within the limits of the
town, outside the area affected by these proceedings. Surely
this is so remote to the territory involved as to be of no
significance.
Considering, then, the whole field of direct or special
benefits which the town conferred or could be expected to
confer upon the territory involved there is literally nothing
of any substance or significance to which the town can
point, and the findings of the Trial Court are beyond dispute.
(b)

The future Growth and Expansion of the
Town Will Not Require the Disconnected
Territory, nor is it Necessary for the Use of
the Town.

In paragraph 22 of its findings (R. 85) the Trial Court
found that the growth and expansion of the town did not
require the disconnected territory and that the same was
not necessary for the use of the town.
This finding is not assailed in the brief of the town,
and it is supported by the evidence.
The physical facts alone are sufficient to demonstrate
this proposition. Here involved is an area of more than
five full sections of land lying at the very back door of
Salt Lake City. Yet in more than a hundred years after
the settlement of the surrounding communities, there were
but six homes in this entire area, four of which were located on the very easterly fringe of the disconnected tract.
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Although the two old subdivisions herein referred to had
been platted for more than half a century, not one person
had ventured to build any kind of a dwelling or structure
thereon. The witness Kiepe, a professional real estate appraiser, in his testimony explained why this low, swampy
area had not developed and demonstrated that the logical
ar~a for the development and expansion of the town lay
within the high ground northerly and easterly of the boundaries of the town as they existed prior to the ordinance of
April, 1952. Within this general area of high ground in the
south end of Davis County, this witness estimated that
there was room for 24,000 families (R. 367). It is within
this area that the logical growth of the town will necessarily
occur.
The town had no schools, no churches, no parks or
public areas, and there is no suggestion in the· record that
it needed or intended to use any of the disconnected territory for any of these purposes. Clearly, the findings of the
Trial Court on this point were properly made.
(c) There is no Interrelation or Dependency between the Disconnected Territory and the
Town.
A disposition of this point requires an examination
of the Utah case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co.,
et al., 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044, cited in the brief of the
town.
In that case, petitioners sought disconnection from
Mammoth City of an area of territory. Disconnection was
decreed by the trial court. On appeal, this court, in a divided opinion, reversed except as to a small area in the
west part of the town.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
On the facts the case is readily distinguished from the
one at bar.
In the Mammoth City case, the area involved was a
part of the town upon its incorporation, and had at all
times been within the town prior to the commencement of
the disconnection proceedings.
Mammoth City was a mining town. The court found
that if there were no mines operated in the immediate vicinity, the town would never have existed. The municipality
was organized for the sole purpose of providing homes for
those who worked in and about the mines located within
the city and other mines in the vicinity. A large percent
of the men residing in Mammoth City were employees of
the mines located within the boundaries of the city. The
mines located within the boundaries of Mammoth City and
the municipality itself were entirely tied up together.
The following findings of the Trial Court in its paragraph 27 completely distinguish the case at bar from the
Mammoth City case.
As hereinabove found, the Town of North Salt
Lake was organized in 1946. No part of the territory here sought to be disconnected was then or at
any time prior to the annexation of April 21, 1952,
included within the town. Between 1946 and April,
1952, certain companies, particularly those relating
to the petroleum industry purchased lands in Davis
County outside and westerly of the corporate limits
of the town and established their plants and facilities upon such premises. It was not until the establishment of these industries that the annexation
of April 15, 1952, and the subsequent disconnection
proceedings here involved occurred. · The creation
and establishment of the town, however was en-
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tirely unrelated to the location and establishment of
these industries. There are no schools or churches
within the town, and a careful consideration of all
the evidence shows no close community relationship
or dependency between any of the property owners
in the area sought to be disconnected and the Town
of North Salt Lake. The most important, from the
standpoint of property valuation and number of employees, of such property owners is Salt Lake Refining Company. The evidence shows, as hereinbefore
found, that this company was under the necessity of
securing its water supply primarily from Salt Lake
City. In order to secure access to its premises, it
built, at its own cost and expense, a road leading
from its plant southerly to connect with the streets
of Salt Lake City. All highway traffic to and from
its plant passes over this road and onto the streets
of Salt Lake City or state highways before any such
traffic may reach a street within the town of North
Salt Lake. Some two hundred persons are employed
by Salt Lake Refining Company, but only one of
these employees at the time of hearing resided within the Town of North Salt Lake. The town has a
post office but none of the mail,of this company is
either received or deposited at this post office. The
dependency upon and relationship of this company
to a municipality is with Salt Lake City rather than
the Town of North Salt Lake.
These findings are based upon undisputed facts. They
are not assailed in the brief of the town. The facts are
fully developed by the witnesses Pramme and Ayer (R.
242-68, 295-325, 335-351).
(d)

The Health and Welfare of the Residents of
the Town do not Require that the Disconnected Territory Remain a Part of the Town.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

Much of the record in this case deals with the so-called
sewer problem, and if we correctly interpret the brief of
the town, its counsel rely strongly upon the sewer problem
as grounds for reversal of the decree of the trial court.
In order to properly understand this problem, it seems
essential to us to recognize at the outset certain facts on
which there is no dispute whatever.
The south boundary line of the town abuts upon a portion of the north boundary line of Salt Lake City. Within
the disconnected area Salt Lake City owns in fee more than
five hundred acres of land, an area greater than that embraced within the whole town prior to the Annexation of
April, 1952. The town itself has no sewage system whatever. Salt Lake City with its population of over 180,000
must without interruption dispose of its sewage every hour
of every day. For many years, and long prior to the organization of the town, Salt Lake City has disposed of its
sewage by carrying the same in two . closed conduits to
points in Sections 11 and 10, at which points the closed
conduits empty into an open canal which runs west from
said point in Section 11 about a mile and a quarter where
it passes under the Jordan River, and runs northerly along
the west side of the Jordan River until the sewage is discharged into Great Salt Lake.
There is no doubt that the open sewer canal is unsightly. Nor is there any doubt that this method of sewage
disposal is outmoded and should be replaced with a modern
treatment plant. Equally clear, however, is the fact that
until another method of disposal is provided, the one now
employed must be continued. This inescapable fact cannot
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be either changed or avoided whether the town annexes the
territory in question or not.
The town does not level its attack upon the fact that
raw sewage is discharged into Great Salt Lake, but rather
upon the existence of the open sewer canal. About a mile
and a quarter of this canal is located within the territory
here involved, while some eight miles extends beyond such
territory along the Jordan River to Great Salt Lake. The
town does not suggest that this eight miles of open canal
be covered or eliminated. So what this case really gets
down to is a question of what should be done with the one
and a quarter miles of open sewer canal within the territory.
The town relies upon the testimony of its witness Dr.
Spendlove, who was recalled for further direct examination
by counsel for the town and testified (R. 495-6) as follows:
Q Doctor, so I may understand your testimony,
the sewer, the open ditch sewer, starting here, and
also the Cudahy open ditch, if they were covered
by a conduit out in this area for the City to the
Jordan River, it would lessen the health hazard to
the people living and working at these industries?

A May I just confine my statement on that.
We have assurances that Salt Lake City is going to
put in a treatment in that ditch, that is covered. We
recognize a potential hazard, but, on the other hand,
we would not want to see the City spend one hundred
thousand, or whatever it costs, to cover that ditch
that is going to be no longer in use than six months
or five years from now. We would want to see the
money spent to the best advantage to provide good
treatment, taking away the exposure to the people
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as quickly as possible with the least amount of
money.
THE COURT:

Q Where would the treatment take place?
A They propose some treatment plants west
and south of that, I understand, but I don't know
the exact place.
Q

Somewhere along the open ditch area?

A No, I think considerable west and south of
the area.
MR. HANSON:
Q

To the west and south of the Jordan River?

A That is my impression. I haven't located
the area on the rna p.
THE COURT:
Q You mean the sewage would run through
that open ditch before it was treated?

A No, come in a closed ditch to the treatment
plant and treated.
MR. HOLMGREN: At 11th North or West
and 17th North, your Honor, in Salt Lake County.
THE COURT:

Q You would eliminate that open ditch entirely
in that area?
A

That is my opinion.
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Q

It would be routed in a different way?

A Yes, that it what I am saying, the ditch
would have no value if covered at the present time.
The conclusion of Dr. Spendlove is sensible and proper.
Surely the only feasible way to solve the sewage problem
is at the source, before the raw sewage is discharged into
any open canal or into Great Salt Lake. It is difficult to
imagine a more foolish or wasteful expenditure than paying
thousands of dollars in covering a segment of a canal when
the source of the sewage is unaffected and the remainder
of the canal is left open.
Patently then, the answer to the sewage problem was
not annexation of the territory involved here, but rather
treatment of the raw sewage.
Proper treatment involves careful planning, substantial
expenditure by Salt Lake City and enabling the legislation
to raise the necessary funds.
An effort to provide such legislation was made in
Chapter 21, Laws of Utah, 1953, which was before this
Court for consideration in the case of Moss v. Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d
961.

What could the town possibly accomplish on this sewer
problem by annexation? What change could be made?
What could be done which is not now being done? There
are some broad general assertions in the evidence, but
nothing specifically is suggested in either the record or
the brief. This is so for the simple reason that the prob-
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lem of Salt Lake City's sewage disposal is one wholly outside of and unrelated to any questions of annexation.
There is some evidence in the record concerning the
drainage through the area in question of the sewage arising
from the stock yards and the plant of the Cudahy Packing
Company. The control of this sewage lies at its source. If
the town had been genuinely concerned with such control,
it would have annexed the propertly on which it arose.
Instead, the town elected to exclude such property from
its corporate limits and create the island area identified
on the prints attached to this brief.
By reference again to these maps, it is seen that the
sewer canal of Salt Lake City occupies a very narrow strip
in the southerly portion of the premises involved.
If one were to concede that some annexation were justified to control this canal, no reason is perceived for the
necessity of annexing more than five whole sections of land,
some of it nearly two miles distant from the canal in question.
We have examined all the disconnection cases which
have come before this Court under the statutes in question.
They are Young v. Salt Lake City, supra, (1902); Gilmor
v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932, (1904) ; In re Fulmer, 33
Utah 43, 92 P. 768, (1906) ; Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 P. 376, (1926); In re Smithfield
City, 70 Utah 564, 262 P. 105, (1927); In re Chief Consolidated Mining Company, supra, (1926) ; Plutus Mining Company v. Orme, et al., 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132, (1930) ; In
re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 2d 468, (1935) ; and Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P. 2d 1195, (1937).
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In none of these where disconnection was decreed were
the elements of justice and equity stronger than in the case
at bar. Only in the Mammoth City case (In re Chief Consolidated Mining Company) was the decree of disconnection reversed on the issue of justice and equity. The facts
in that case, as we have shown, are so essentially different
from those here presented, that the decision is not in any
way controlling.
The excerpts from the Utah cases cited by the town in
its brief are not particularly helpful in the case at bar, and
the two Kentucky cases cited therein were decided under
an entirely different statute. The excerpt from Collins v.
Town of Crittenden, at page 21 of the town's brief, is, in
fact, substantially nothing more than a quotation from
the Kentucky statute, which provides that the court may
annex lands even against the will of the majority if it finds
that "a failure to annex * * * will materially retard
the prosperity of the town and of the owners and inhabitants of the territory sought to be annexed * * * "
So far as we are able to determine, only two states,
Utah and Nebraska presently have statutes containing the
"justice and equity" provisions. For this reason, we have
not cited cases on this point from outside jurisdictions other
than Nebraska. A brief consideration of the Nebraska cases
may, however, be helpful.
The term "equity and justice" was construed in the
case of Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 520, 118 N.
W. 127. This was an action to disconnect 200 acres of land
from the city having more than 1,000 and less than 5,000
population. The land was unplatted farm land and it was
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alleged that it received no benefits in common with the
platted portion of defendant, and the land was retained in
the city for revenue purposes. The statute provided, if the
court find, "that justice and equity require such territory,
or any part thereof, be disconnected from such city or territory, it shall enter a decree accordingly." The court held
the statute constitutional, citing Young v. Salt Lake City
and other cases, the statutes being essentially alike.
In defining the term "justice and equity", the court
says that the statutory section should be construed to mean
"that whenever unplatted lands within the boundaries of,
and adjacent to, the corporate limits of such city or village,
are so situated that they do not have that unity of interest
with the platted portion thereof (in the maintenance of
village government), justice and equity dictate that they
should be excluded therefrom."
In Kuebler v. City of Kearney, 151 Neb. 698, 39 N. W.
2d 415, the court says:
When an action is brought, either under a statute
or at common law, to remove agricultural lands
from within the corporate limits of a city or village,
on the basis that justice and equity require that it
be disconnected therefrom, it is sufficient to show
that the lands sought to be removed have no unity
or community of interest with such city or village
and receive few, if any, benefits by reason thereof.
In Runyan v. Village of Ong, 154 Neb. 127, 47 N. W. 2d
97, the court found that the facts were substantially as
follows: Plaintiff's land was south of and adjoined the
railroad right of way on the north. It was bounded on the
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west by a highway which is an extension of the main street
of the village. The buildings on the property were 1000 feet
distant from any building in the direction of the village.
The land not occupied by buildings was used as pasture.
It was never platted or subdivided. The business section
of the village was north of the railroad. No place of business was south of the railroad. There were only three residences south of the railroad that were in the village limits
and these were all on an east and west road 14. mile south
of the railroad. The population of the village was 190.
There was no reason to foresee any extended growth. There
was no tendency toward business or residence development
south of the railroad. There were many vacant lots in the
business section of the village and ample space for any
contemplated residential needs. There was evidence that
the village had maintained the roads on the west and south
of plaintiff's tract in conjunction with the township. There
was a street light near the southwest corner of plaintiff's
tract and another near the northwest corner. Electric energy was supplied to plaintiff's residence by the Consumers
Public Power District. The village maintained a volunteer
fire department and a part time village marshal. The police
and fire protection afforded was negligible. It was plain
from the record that the plaintiff's land received no more
benefits from such protection than did adjoining agricultural lands not within the corporate limits of the village.
The village had no water or sewer systems. No sidewalks
had been built south of the tracks. The court said :
We think the evidence shows that the plaintiff's
tract is rural in character and that its location makes
it unfavorable for development as an integral part
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of the village. The evidence clearly shows there is
no unity or community of interest between the property and the village. We fail to find any evidence of
any material benefit accruing to this land by reason
of its being within the village. Consequently we
conclude that justice and equity require that it be
disconnected from the village. * * *

Davidson v. City of Revenna, 153 Neb. 652, 45 N. W.
2d 741, involved a tract of 27 acres lying in the northeast
corner of a city. It was used wholly for agricultural purposes except for one residence in the southwest corner. The
court said:
* * * The residence property is connected with
the city water system and is furnished with electric
lights from the Consumers Public Power District.
The closest sewer line is one-half block west of the
west line of the Hughes tract, the residence being
about 150 feet east of the west boundary. The closest fire hydrant is one block west of the southwest
corner of the property. There is no street along the
west side of the property except for a very short
distance at the south end. There is no demand for
any part of the tract for residence lots or other city
purposes. There is no evidence of the development or
growth of the city in the general direction of this
property. It is rural in character and its location
appears unfavorable to its development as an integral part of the city. An examination of all of the
evidence, including the photographs taken at various
points on this acreage, convinces us that there is
no community of interest between the property and
the city of Revenna. While it is true the property
is benefited by receiving the benefits of city water
and electric lights, this is not necessarily a controlling factor. Other properties outside of the corporate limits receive similar benefits. But, considered
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as a whole, justice and equity require that the
Hughes tract be disconnected from the city.

* * * That part of the judgment denying relief
to plaintiffs Hughes is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court with instructions to
disconnect the Hughes property * * * from the
city of Revenna.
In Village of Hartington v. Luge, et al., 33 Neb. 624,
50 N. W. 957, the village annexed certain lands and under
a statute brought an action against the landowners of the
area annexed to have the court confirm the annexation.
It was alleged that the annexation was made for the purposes of protection from fire, preservation of health, order,
and cleanliness of said village and for the purpose of raising the revenue or taxes to help defray the expenses of said
village, and that said ends would in justice and equity require the annexation of said territory to said village. It
was further alleged that other material benefits and advantages besides those mentioned would be derived from
such annexation by reason of said territory lying across
and obstructing the approach and egress of the public and
the citizens of said village to and from said village to the
public highways adjacent to said territory. The statute
provided that if the court found that the territory would
"receive material benefit by its annexation, or that justice
and equity require such annexation of said territory," then
a decree should be made accordingly. The trial court decreed annexation. The Supreme Court reversed the same
saying in part :

* * * The facts stated in the petition do not
bring the case within the provisions of the statute.
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It does not appear that the property sought to be
annexed would be benefited in any manner whatever, nor that justice and equity require such annexation. The principal benefit would be to the village
by adding to the taxable property therein, but this,
of itself, is not sufficient. If this action could be
sustained upon the facts pleaded and proved, then
the village might annex a whole township or county,
as such an annexation could be placed upon the same
grounds as it is sought to predicate this action upon.
* * * It is not the policy of the law to bring
large tracts of agricultural land within a municipal
corporation. In fact there is an inconsistency in so
doing. The territory of a municipal corporation is
ordinarily subdivided into lots and blocks, and the
residents thereon are not supposed to obtain a livelihood from the cultivation of the soil. Where it is
necessary, therefore, to extend the village limits to
obtain more lots or land that should be divided into
lots, an action of this kind may be sustained. But
it cannot be sustained unless the statutory grounds
exist.
CONCLUSION
The power of the district court to deal with the disconnection of the territory involved is expressly conferred
by the statute. This jurisdiction was invoked by a petition
filed in accordance with its provisions. Disconnection proceedings are controlled by the rules of civil procedure.
Under these rules, and the statute, the issue of representation must be determined by the proof presented when the
issue is submitted to and determined by the court. In the
determination of this issue, all parties, interveners and
original signers stand in the same position. Under the
application of these propositions, a majority of the real
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property owners signed the petition for disconnection as
required by the statute.
The town conferred no direct or special benefits of any
substance upon the disconnected territory. It was not necessary for the use of the town, nor will its future growth or
expansion require such territory. There is no interrelation
or dependency between the town and the territory involved.
The sewage problem is not materially related to the
annexation of the territory in question. The solution of this
problem depends upon treatment of the raw sewage at or
near the source. The enclosure of that portion of the open
sewer within the town would not materially relieve that
problem, nor was it actually advocated by the witnesses for
the town.
The decree of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WESLEY G. HOWELL,
GAYLEN S. YOUNG,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney,
Salt Lake City Corporation,
HOMER HOLMGREN,
Assistant City Attorney,
S. N. CORNWALL,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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by

Open sewer canal runs northerly f'rom
point wb.er~e it passes under Jordan
River about eii#Lt miles to Great
Salt
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